7. Grants and enforcement

State

Two systems, one built and one designed. - Executor policy v0: Built in venue-node, default-deny, exercised by the real-Docker exit test. It is a local policy, not a grant system. - Owner-signed grants (node contract §6): Draft. A resource-addr spike prototypes the typed-address rule. Nothing grant-path is built to the contract.

BenixOS enforces authority at the resource, not at the edge. The node agent is where scope, attenuation and revocation get checked. That is why capability enforcement is treated as the same track as hardening Venue, not a separate priority .

The grant model (design)

One grant system (contract §6):

Three rules for the grant path

  1. Grants name typed resources and match segment by segment. A grant MUST NOT be matched against a raw string.
  2. An address is parsed once into a typed value that rejects every non-canonical spelling. The gate, the proof-of-possession signature and the executor all consume that one value.
  3. The executor builds upstream requests from typed segments with per-segment encoding, then asserts scheme, host, port, base prefix and segment count. Unknown means deny.

Attenuation and revocation

Placement checks (§5.3)

For a placement the agent MUST check:

  1. the signature (registry key);
  2. the registry incarnation;
  3. that the revision exceeds a high-water mark persisted on disk;
  4. that the lease is live by the agent's own monotonic clock;
  5. that the grants verify offline and cover the work;
  6. that the spec fits node-local policy.

Any failure refuses the placement. The fencing token is (registry key id, incarnation, hold revision), minted by the registry. A hub ULID is never a fencing token or evidence of order. A restored registry starts a new incarnation and the owner re-anchors nodes.

Partition policy (§5.5)

Each workload declares what happens if the node loses its registry:

Policy Behaviour
replace The replacement starts only after the old lease has expired plus a clock-skew margin
hold Keep running until the authority returns
self-stop Stop when the lease ends

"Unknown" refuses new work and must not kill running work by itself.

What exists today

qr-cap in the gateway: live, being reworked

Proof-of-possession signing over the path, with grants held as household-wide prefix records in the gateway's consent file. The plan is to rework it into a typed-address enforcement library. The path-spelling set the library must survive includes //, ., .., %2e, %2f, double encoding, \, ?, #, ;, case variants, Unicode, control characters and empty segments.

Executor policy v0: built, default-deny

The executor's policy is local to the node, read once at start, and unknown keys are an error. Nothing runs until the owner allows an image by digest. The policy table has 69 rows (POLICY-V0.md). What the real run verified:

Control Result
Image Only an owner-allowed image; a disallowed image is refused. A tag is always pulled; a digest only if absent.
Privilege Privileged mode refused. All capabilities dropped. no-new-privileges.
Docker socket A workload that asks for docker.sock is refused.
Mounts Any host-path mount is denied (rule P5). Traversal and plain relative mounts are refused. Named volumes are the unbuilt next step.
User Workloads run as uid 10100. The policy cannot allow uids 10000 or 10001.
Filesystem Read-only root filesystem.
Network A dedicated user-defined icc=false bridge. Egress is still open.
Resources Limits applied (pids, memory).
Refusals Reported with the exact rule id; the daemon's own event record shows nothing was created.

Ownership and identity of containers

The executor acts only on containers carrying the managed label, this node's name, and this install's random instance id. A foreign or old container is never touched. down -v creates a new identity and orphans the previous workloads: they are left alone, not removed.

The review gate

Grant-path code is subject to a review gate (priorities §6), intended to live in a PR template: an independent review, mutation evidence that each check is load-bearing, and a request-recording mock that proves the upstream received nothing on a refused request. The M1 milestone's exit test is built on it.

Gaps, stated plainly

Next

8. The gateway and services